We examine whether contractors with cost plus contracts earn a higher profit, and whether the higher profit is associated with cost shifting, using a unique set of data of federal procurement contracts between the years 2005 and 2010. Prior research often examines government contractor profitability without differentiating the contract types, which determines the contractor's ability to cost-shift. We identify firms that are awarded cost plus contracts in some years but not in other years. We find their profitability significantly increases during the years with cost plus contracts. We also find that these firms exhibit greater discretionary expenditures during the years with cost plus contracts, relative to the years without, which is consistent with cost shifting. However, effective monitoring through the Cost Accounting Standards helps to mitigate such behavior.
Introduction
Public procurement is the purchase by federal, state, and local governments of products and services. The US government spends a large amount of money on public procurement. For example, it reported $391.3 billion and $540.1 billion on federal procurement in the years 2005 and 2010, respectively.
1 Partially due to its significance in amount, federal procurement spending has generated controversy. Critics claim that government contractors earn excessive profits at the taxpayers' expense and that the government does not sufficiently monitor the contractors. To respond to the growing dissatisfaction against federal contractors, President Obama has proposed and implemented a series of initiatives to tighten the requirements for federal contractors. One of these measures is a move away from cost plus contracts and toward more fixed price contracts (Michaels and Cole, 2009 ).
Fixed price and cost plus are the two most common types of procurement contracts offered by the US government to contractors. 2 For a fixed price contract, a contractor provides a product or service to the government at a fixed price that is determined through negotiation or bidding. For a cost plus contract, the contract price is equal to a contractor's cost to produce the product or service plus a profit margin. That is, with a cost plus contract, the government reimburses the contractor for its declared costs to fulfill the contract and pays an additional fee, the profit, according to the negotiation. Therefore, if offered a cost plus contract, a contractor has an incentive 1 See: http://www.usaspending.gov/ 2 In practice, there are hybrids of both types of contracts. For example, Rogerson (1992) describes four common types of contracts employed by the US Department of Defense: (1) pure fixed price, (2) pure cost reimbursement, (3) incentive fixed price (i.e., realized costs are reimbursed up to a pre-specified threshold level), and (4) incentive cost reimbursement (i.e., incentive fixed price contracts revert to pure cost reimbursement at a pre-specified threshold cost level). For our analysis, we refer to any contracts with revenue that is sensitive to the seller's cost as cost plus. In our sensitivity analysis, we ensure our results are robust to this empirical choice.
to inflate its reported costs to earn a higher profit. Specifically, the contractor could use its accounting discretion to shift costs from other segments of its business to the government contract. 3 We use a unique set of data to examine whether contractors with cost plus contracts earn higher profits and whether these higher profits are associated with cost shifting. To control for confounding exogenous factors, we identify firms that are awarded cost plus contracts in some years and not in other years. We find their profitability significantly increases during the years with cost plus contracts. We also find that these firms exhibit greater discretionary expenditures during the years with cost plus contracts, consistent with cost shifting. However, effective monitoring through the Cost Accounting Standards seems to mitigate this behavior.
A vast theoretical literature explores the intricacies of optimal contracts and information problems in procurement setting (Laffont and Tirole 1986; McAfee and McMillan 1986; Rogerson 1992; Rogerson 1994; etc.) . Since the government cannot costlessly observe the true cost incurred by a contractor, the contractor with a cost plus contract can manipulate reported cost through cost inflation or cost shifting. Rogerson (1992) demonstrates that a government contractor could overallocate overhead to government contracts while under-allocating overhead in commercial contracts, to strategically shift cost from commercial to government business. Furthermore, given these informational asymmetries, a first best solution can never be achieved. In contrast, fixed price contracts do not lead to the distortion of incentives as the contractor fully captures any profit/loss earned under the fixed price, regardless of its real cost or reported cost.
Empirical evidence on government contractors' cost shifting has been scant, mainly due to lack of data. Until 2004, information about which government contractors received cost plus 3 As a result, cost plus contracts are oftentimes singled out for being abuse prone. For example, in a U.S. House of Representative report (2004) , prepared for Rep. Henry Waxman, a section states "Reliance on Abuse-Prone Contract Types Is Increasing" and the section discusses how cost plus contracts expose taxpayers to risk.
contracts was not publicly disclosed. A few empirical papers examine cost shifting and profitability among government contractors but without differentiating the types of contracts. Thomas and Tung (1992) find evidence that Department of Defense contractors shift pension costs to the government. Lichtenberg (1992) finds government contractors earned excess profits on government contracts in the 1980s and suggests cost shifting as the reason. However, McGown and Vendrzyk (2002) hypothesize that a government contractor can shift costs only in segments with both government and commercial contracts. They fail to find significant differences in profitability between mixed segments (i.e. with both government and commercial business) and segments with only government or only commercial profits. Therefore they conclude that government contractors do not engage in cost shifting.
Prior research has also examined cost shifting in other settings. Eldenburg and Soderstrom (1996) , using data from the state of Washington, find that hospitals engage in cost shifting among payers. The practice they focus on involves hospital managers purposefully biasing budgeted information. Eldenburg and Kallapur (1997) likewise examine the hospitals' response to a Medicare policy change in 1983. They find that the hospitals maximize their revenues by changing their patient mix and overhead. Eldenburg and Krishnan (2006) provide a comprehensive review on cost and incentive issues in the healthcare industry.
We examine whether government contractors with cost plus contracts earn unusually high profits and, if so, whether the high profitability is associated with cost shifting facilitated by accounting discretion. To address our research questions, we construct a database of 4.9 million federal procurement contracts (5,745 firm-years, 1,137 firms) between 2005 and 2010 from the Federal Procurement Data System website. 4 For our main test, we identify U.S. publicly traded government contractors that have been awarded a cost plus contract in at least one year and only a fixed price contract in at least another year during our sample period. The final sample consists of 258 firms or 1,505 firm-years. This sample enables us to use the firm as its own control and mitigates concerns that firm characteristics drives differences in cost shifting and profitability. We find that our sample firms have greater discretionary expenditures as well as higher profitability during the years with cost plus contracts, relative to other years without cost plus contracts. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that government contractors that are awarded cost plus contracts shift costs to obtain higher profits.
We also examine the effect of government monitoring. We identify contracts that are required to be compliant with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). When contracts (both fixed and cost plus) are subject to CAS coverage, the firm is required to provide a detailed disclosure about the accounting policies used to determine CAS related costs. Thus it faces increased monitoring by the government to prevent cost shifting. We predict the association between cost plus contracts and profitability to decrease as the percentage of revenue subject to CAS increases.
Our results are consistent with our predictions.
We conduct several sensitivity tests to rule out alternative explanations. First, we employ different samples to ensure our results are not sensitive to sample selection. For our main analysis, the firm serves as its own control, by using 1,505 firm-years (258 firms) with at least one year with a cost contract and one year without a cost contract over the sample period. Our results are robust to two alternative subsamples: (1) all contractors (5,745 firm-years, 1,137 firms) and (2) all contractors with at least one cost contract (2,201 firm-years, 383 firms).
Second, for our main analyses, we refer to any contracts with revenue that is sensitive to the seller's cost as cost plus. However, in practice contracts are often hybrids that fall within the spectrum between cost plus and fixed price. Our results are robust to using a sample that includes only pure fixed price and pure cost reimbursement.
Note that our findings do not endorse the view that cost plus contracts should be reduced or even eliminated in government procurement. Different forms of contracts serve different purposes and may make sense in different contracting environments. Prior research on optimal contract form demonstrates that factors such as project risk, market competition, contractor characteristics, and trust are critical in determining the contract form. For example, when a project is long term and highly uncertain, the government is more likely to adopt cost plus contract to share risk. The same is true is when a contractor has a low risk tolerance because it is young, small, highly leveraged, or all of the above. Fixed price contracts often imply higher risk for the contractor, thus tend to be used only when the project outcome is certain or when the contractor has a high risk tolerance. Furthermore, the government can rarely obtain the contractors' true costs information because frequent audits are costly. The government must trade off the potential gains recovered from these audits and the monitoring cost of doing them.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we are the first paper to examine government procurement using contract-level data, which provides a cleaner setting than prior studies. McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) Second, we examine research and development (R&D) expense and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expense as the expenditures used by contractors to shift costs. Thomas and Tung (1992) examine defense contractors and whether they shift pension costs across contracts and time to the government. They find evidence of cost shifting using pension costs. One difficulty in interpreting their results is that cost plus contracts could provide an incentive to increase promised pension cost benefits. Thus their observed cost increase might be due to increasing promised pension payments rather than cost shifting. In contrast, R&D and SG&A are not susceptible to this problem. Our results confirm that procurement contractors shift costs, consistent with Thomas and Tung (1992) , and provide evidence on other types of expenditures used for cost shifting besides pension costs.
Third, we provide evidence that cost shifting may explain the relatively higher profitability of government contractors. Lichtenberg (1992) finds excess profits on government contracts in the 1980s and suggests cost shifting as the explanation. McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) do not examine cost shifting directly and infer from their segment profitability comparisons that cost shifting is not an explanation for excess profitability. They suggest the result in Lichtenberg (1992) is likely due to other non-accounting explanations. In contrast, we directly examine both cost shifting and profitability. We find evidence that cost shifting is one explanation for relatively higher profitability.
Lastly, we are the first researchers to provide evidence on the effectiveness of cost accounting standards. Our results suggest that cost accounting standards mitigate the positive association between cost plus contracts and profitability. When cost accounting standards apply, there is increased monitoring by the government and increased disclosure of costs, which likely decrease the contractors' ability to shift costs. Although our evidence illuminates the benefits of cost accounting standards, we do not attempt to investigate the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of these standards.
Background and hypotheses development
The terms under fixed price and cost plus contracts differ, which results in different incentives for the contractors. For a fixed price contract, the contractor provides a product or service to the government at a fixed price. For example, the Department of Homeland Security might contract with Dell Inc. to buy laptops at a fixed price per unit. In most cases, no ex post renegotiation of the agreed-upon price is permitted. Therefore the government knows the price upfront. Since the price is fixed, contract revenue is not sensitive to the seller's cost of production.
The seller bears all risk associated with any cost overruns.
With cost plus contracts, the revenue is sensitive to the seller's cost. The contract revenue is equal to the seller's production cost plus a fixed fee or guaranteed profit margin. Thus the government does not know the final price before the project begins and bears the risk of any overruns. Generally, when the costs are difficult to estimate or when the product or service is hard to explicitly define ahead of time, the government may have incentives to offer a cost plus contract.
For example, an aerospace firm might contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to build a rocket propulsion unit. For the aerospace company to produce the unit, it needs to make a transaction-specific investments in technology and human capital because the product is highly specialized and only purchased by NASA. From the aerospace firms' perspective, engaging in this transaction under a fixed price contract may be too risky given the project's required investment and its inherent uncertainty and complexity. To appropriately share risk and incentivize the aerospace firm to invest sufficiently, NASA would likely have to offer a cost plus contract and bear the risk of any cost overruns.
Under cost plus contracts, contractors have incentives to shift costs to the government, whereas under fixed price contracts they generally do not. Obviously, if incurred costs were observable, there could be no cost shifting: the government would reimburse the contractor for expenditures incurred only for the contracted project. However, given information asymmetry between the contractor and the government, which is typical, true cost information is difficult to verify. Since the contractor's revenue increases in the cost reimbursed, the contractor's profit will be higher when it shifts other cost to the government. Specifically, if a firm receives cost plus contracts in some years and only fixed price contracts in others, its profitability could vary across years due to the differential availability of cost shifting based on contract type. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Government procurement contractors' profitability is higher in years with a cost plus contract relative to years without a cost plus contract. Thomas and Tung (1992) point out that contractor firms can shift costs both inter-contract and inter-time. With inter-contract shifting, firms shift cost from noncost plus contracts (e.g., private sector or fixed price government contracts) to cost plus contracts within the same contract period. For example, consider a firm that spends a total of $100 million on R&D and reports $100 million in R&D expense on the income statement. Out of $100 million, it incurs $20 million for the government contract and $80 million for its commercial business. Imagine that it could shift $5 million of R&D expenses from commercial business to the government project. The government must then reimburse the firm $25 million for its R&D expenses, and the firm's commercial work gets "subsidized" by $5 million. Empirically, it is difficult to observe intercontract cost shifting because, with or without the shifting, the firm reports $100 million in R&D expense on the income statement.
With inter-period shifting, firms shift costs into contract periods with a cost plus contract from periods without such a contract. Consider again the firm that spends a total of $100 million on R&D. Again assume the contractor should incur $20 million of R&D expenses on the government project. With inter-period cost shifting, the firm could intentionally engage in more R&D than necessary to fulfill the government contract, and this research could benefit its commercial business in the future. If the incremental expense amounts to an additional $5 million in R&D costs, the government ends up subsidizing the contractor's commercial business by overpaying $5 million dollars. With inter-period cost shifting, the firm reports $105 million on the income statement for the year it has a cost plus contract with the government, instead of the $100 million it would have reported if it had not had the contract. Therefore inter-period cost shifting can be detected empirically from the firm's financial statement information.
In this paper, we proxy for the government contractors' inter-period cost shifting using their discretionary expenditures. Our second hypothesis is therefore:
H2: Government procurement contractors' discretionary expenditures are higher in years with a cost plus contract relative to years with only fixed price contracts.
When there is information asymmetry between the contractor and the government, the contractor can include more expenditures in reimbursed cost than were incurred. Since the contractor's revenue is increasing in cost, more cost shifting will lead to a greater profitability.
However, the government can increase its monitoring to prevent cost shifting. With increased monitoring, the government can decrease the contractors' ability to shift costs. As such, we expect the association between cost contracts and profitability to decrease as monitoring by the government increases.
In terms of increased monitoring, some government contracts are subject to Cost Accounting Standards. Cost Accounting Standards are a set of 19 standards and rules for use in determining costs. 5 A contract could be subject to full CAS coverage (i.e., required to follow all 19 standards), modified CAS coverage (required to follow only four standards: CAS #401, #402, #405, and #406) 6 , or be exempt from coverage. There are many reasons a contract could be exempt from CAS, including that it is less than $7.5 million (and the firm does not have other contracts over $7.5 million), it is for commercial items, or it has "adequate price competition." When contracts are subject to full CAS coverage, the firm is required to provide a CAS Disclosure Statement, which describes in detail the accounting policies used to determine CAS related costs.
CAS standards can apply for both cost plus contracts and fixed price contracts. For fixed price contracts, the information subject to CAS could be used in determining the contract price (i.e., the government could use the information to set the fixed price). For cost plus contracts, the information subject to CAS could be used in determining the fixed fee, profit margin, or reimbursed costs. To the extent contracts subject to CAS indicate increased monitoring efforts by the government to prevent cost shifting, we expect the association between cost plus contracts and profitability to decrease as monitoring by the government increases. This leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: Government contractors with cost plus contracts are relatively less profitable when cost accounting standards apply.
Research Design

Measure of discretionary expenditure
Discretionary expenditures are defined as the sum of R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenditures. We estimate the following model based on the entire Compustat sample with data available to estimate the models following Roychowdhury (2006) . We estimate the normal level of discretionary expenditures as follows:
where DisExpt = research and development expense plus advertising and selling, general, and administrative expense Assetst-1 = total assets St = sales.
Model (1) is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year with at least 15 observations. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the influence of outliers. For each firm-year, abnormal discretionary expenditure (Abnormal DisExp)
is the residual from the corresponding industry-year regression. As an alternative proxy for abnormally high discretionary expenditures, we create an indicator variable equal to one if the residual from model (1) is in the highest quintile and zero otherwise (Abnormal DisExp_Q10) for a given year.
Hypothesis testing
To test our first hypothesis (H1), we adopt the following regression model used in Core et al. (1999) : ROA = β0 + β1Cost contract + β2Lagged ROA + β3StdROA + β4Log sales + β4Log procurement sales + εt (2) Where
StdROA
= standard deviation of ROA during the prior three years including year t Log sales = the natural logarithm of sales in millions Log procurement sales = the natural logarithm of procurement contract sales in millions.
In all regressions, continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the influence of outliers, and the standard errors are corrected to control for clustering across firm and year (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009 ). We include year and industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects. We include the standard deviation of ROA over the fiscal year (Std ROA) and the natural logarithm of annual net sales (LnSales). We augment the Core et al. (1999) (1) is in the highest quintile and zero otherwise Cost contract = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract and zero otherwise Log asset = natural logarithm of total assets in millions Market-to-book = the market value of equity divided by the book value ROA = earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets
The control variables are from Gunny (2010 
%CAS
= percentage of procurement revenue subject to cost accounting standards.
H3 suggests that the positive association between whether the firm has a cost plus contract and performance will be constrained as the government's monitoring effort increases. Our proxy for monitoring is the percentage of contract revenue that is subject to cost accounting standards (%CAS), either full or partial coverage. When CAS applies, specific rules must be applied to determine cost. When full CAS applies, a firm must also produce a CAS Disclosure Statement, which describes in detail the accounting policies used to determine CAS related costs. CAS standards can apply to fixed and cost plus contracts. For fixed contracts, this could help reduce information asymmetry when negotiating the price of the contract. For cost plus contracts, CAS could help by preventing cost shifting. Therefore we expect a negative coefficient on the variable
%CAS.
Of particular interest to us is the coefficient on the interaction between Cost contract and %CAS. If firms with cost plus contracts are less profitable when a greater percentage of contract revenue is subject to CAS, we would expect a negative coefficient on the interaction term, γ3. Sample 1 consists of all procurement contractors in our sample including 5,745 firm-years (1,137 firms), of which 1,315 firm-years involve cost plus contracts and 4,439 firm-years do not. The next two samples exclude firms without cost plus contracts over the sample period. As discussed earlier, the government only offers cost plus contracts in certain situations, such as when the costs are difficult to estimate or when the product or service is hard to explicitly define ahead of time. As such, firms that receive cost contracts could differ from firms that do not receive cost contracts, and this self-selection could bias our results.
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Sample selection
Sample 2 excludes firms without any cost contracts over the sample period and consists of 2,201 firm-years (383 firms), of which 1,315 firm-years have cost plus contracts and 886 do not.
Sample 3 consists of firms with at least one year with a cost plus contract and one year without over the sample period. This sample consists of 1,505 firm-years (258 firms), of which 619 firmyears have cost plus contracts and 886 do not. 7 Sample 3 allows each firm to serve as its own control and mitigate concerns that self-selection drives our findings. Therefore we use sample 3 in our main analysis and conduct sensitivity analysis using sample 1 and sample 2. (541) is the largest and comprises 63% of all cost plus contract revenue. The next largest industry is transportation equipment manufacturing (336), which comprises 14% of cost plus contract revenue. Cost plus contracts are typically awarded when the product or service is hard to explicitly define ahead of time. Consistent with this notion, industries with products and services that are difficult to specify (e.g., professional, scientific, and technical services) are awarded more frequently with cost plus contracts, whereas industries with less complicated offerings (e.g., merchant wholesalers, nondurable goods) are not. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 258 firms with at least one year with a cost plus contract and one year with only fixed price contracts. Panel A provides summary statistics for sample firm-years with at least one cost plus contract, and Panel B for firm-years with only fixed price contracts. Firm-years with cost contracts have significantly higher mean and median abnormal discretionary expenditures (Abnormal DisExp) than firm-years with only fixed price contracts. Also, both the mean and median return on assets (ROA) are significantly higher for firm-years with at least one cost plus contract compared to firm-years with only fixed contracts. Overall, the univariate differences indicate that firm-years with at least one cost contract have and better financial performance and more discretionary expenditures, consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2.
Descriptive statistics
Between the samples with cost plus contracts and fixed price contracts, mean assets, market-to-book, standard deviation of ROA, sales, and procurement sales are not significantly different. These insignificant differences between the two samples indicate that our sample selection procedure that uses the firm as its own control mitigates concerns that firm characteristics drive the variation in our variables of interest (i.e., abnormal discretionary expenditures and return on assets). Lastly, %CAS is significantly higher for the cost plus sample, which is expected since cost plus contracts are more likely to be subject to the cost accounting standards.
Results
Main results
We report the results of estimating model (2) in Table 4 . If cost plus contracts are associated with higher profitability relative to fixed contracts, we would expect the contractors to have better financial performance in years with cost plus contracts. Consistent with this expectation, we find a significantly positive relation between return on assets and whether the firm has a cost contract.
Specifically, the coefficient on Cost contract is 0.008 (p = 0.03). This suggests that firm-years with cost plus contracts have higher profitability compared to firm-years with only fixed price contracts, consistent with our Hypothesis 1. In terms of economic significance, the marginal effect on Cost contract is 0.762%. The marginal effect can be interpreted as the percentage increase in ROA during years with a cost contract. Mean assets for the sample is $3.33 million. Therefore firm-years with cost contracts have earnings before extraordinary items that is $25.37 million higher than firm years without cost contracts, holding all other variables at their mean.
We report the results of estimating model (3) in Table 5 provides evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2 that procurement contractors shift costs across time to the government through cost plus contracts. Overall, our results provide evidence of cost shifting.
Taken together, the results in Table 4 and 5 suggest government procurement contractors shift costs to the government when they have cost plus contracts and this leads to greater profitability relative to firm-years with only fixed price contracts. Please note two important caveats when interpreting these results. First, Hypothesis 2 tests for inter-period cost shifting since it is easier to observe than inter-contract shifting. Even though we test exclusively for inter-period shifting, both types of cost shifting could occur. Second, firms shifting costs and increasing their profits may not be suboptimal from the government's perspective. The optimality of contract form is determined by many factors. Cost plus contracts may lead to distorted incentives, but that does not necessarily imply that fixed price contracts would be preferable.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the positive association between having a cost plus contract and financial performance is constrained as the government's monitoring increases. Our proxy for monitoring is the percentage of contract revenue subject to cost accounting standards (%CAS). We test our third hypothesis (H3) and report the results of model (4) in Table 6 . We continue to observe a positive relation between having a cost contract and the firm's return on assets. The coefficient on %CAS is negative and significant, suggesting firm profitability decreases as the percentage of contract revenue subject to cost accounting standards increases. More importantly, we show that the relation between Cost contract and ROA varies with %CAS in the predicted manner.
Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction between Cost contract and %CAS is significantly negative (γ3 = -0.047, p = 0.08). These results provide support for our third hypothesis (H3) and suggest that as the government's monitoring increases the association between having a cost plus contract and profitability decreases.
Sensitivity Analysis
For our main analysis, our sample consists of the 258 firms that have at least one year with a cost plus contract and one year without, over the sample period (see Panel B of Table 1, sample 3). For this sample, the firm serves as its own control. For a sensitivity test, we explore the robustness of our results to alternative control samples. We estimate model (2) and model (3) using two alternative samples: all contractors (see Panel B of Table 1 , sample 1) and all contractors with at least one cost plus contract over the sample period (see Panel B of Table 1 , sample 2).
We report the result of sensitivity analysis of estimating model (2) in Panel A of Table 9 .
For both alternative control samples, we continue to find a positive association between abnormal discretionary expenditures and the firm having a cost plus contract. Specifically, the coefficient on
Cost contract for Sample 1 is 0.0659 (p = 0.05), and the coefficient on Cost contract for Sample 2 is 0.0906 (p=0.04). Next, we report the result of sensitivity analysis of estimating model (3) in Panel B of Table 9 . Again, we find a significantly positive relation between the firms' return on assets and the firms having a cost contract. Specifically, the coefficient on Cost contract for Sample 1 is 0.0045 (p = 0.02), and the coefficient on Cost contract for Sample 2 is 0.0070 (p = 0.03). This provides evidence that our findings that firm-years with cost plus contracts have higher profitability compared to firm-years with only fixed price contracts is robust to alternative control samples.
We also use alternative categorization of contracts to re-run our tests. For the main analyses, we refer to any contracts with revenue that is sensitive to the seller's cost as cost plus.
However, Rogerson (1992) describes four common types of contracts employed by the U.S.
Department of Defense: (1) pure fixed price, (2) pure cost reimbursement, (3) incentive fixed price (i.e., realized costs are reimbursed up to a pre-specified threshold), and (4) incentive cost reimbursement (i.e., incentive fixed price contracts revert to pure cost reimbursement at a prespecified cost threshold). We estimate model (2) and model (3) on the sample including only (1) pure fixed price and (2) pure cost reimbursement, and the results are robust.
Conclusion
In government procurement, cost plus contracts facilitate risk-sharing between the government and contractors, especially when the product or service is difficult to define ex ante.
Critics, however, claim that contractors abuse the flexibility provided by cost plus contracts and shift other costs to the government to earn higher profits than deserved. In this paper, we use a unique dataset of the U.S. federal procurement contracts to examine whether contractors that are awarded cost plus contracts earn higher profits and whether the higher profits are associated with cost shifting. We find evidence consistent with cost plus contract being associated with higher profitability and greater discretionary expenditures, which indicate cost shifting. We also find that the government's monitoring through the Cost Accounting Standards helps to mitigate this problem.
Our findings, however, do not prove that cost plus contracts are inferior to fixed price contracts. Optimal contract form is determined by many factors, such as project risk, market competition, and contractor characteristics. And cost plus contracts may be necessary when the uncertainty associated with a project is high. Furthermore, once the cost plus contract is chosen, contractors can earn an informational rent since the government cannot observe the true cost incurred. More stringent monitoring is very costly and can be more expensive to the taxpayers. (1) is in the highest quintile and zero otherwise. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract and zero otherwise. Log asset is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions. Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. The regression with Abnormal DisExp is estimated using ordinary least squares. The regression with Abnormal DisExp_10Q is estimated using a logistic regression. Table 6 Regression results of return on assets on whether the firm has cost plus contracts and subject to cost accounting standards The sample consists of 1,505 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2010. The regression includes year and industry (two-digit SIC) indicator variables. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Two-tailed p values are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% levels. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract and zero otherwise. StdROA is the standard deviation of ROA during the prior three years including year t. Log sales is the natural logarithm of sales. Log procurement sales is the natural logarithm of procurement contract sales. %CAS is the percentage of procurement revenue subject to cost accounting standards. (1) is in the highest quintile and zero otherwise. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract and zero otherwise. Log asset is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions. Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost plus contract and zero otherwise. StdROA is the standard deviation of ROA during the prior three years including year t. Log sales is the natural logarithm of sales. Log procurement sales is the natural logarithm of procurement contract sales.
